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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The state appeals from the district court's appellate decision affirming the
dismissal of license suspension proceedings against Matilda Kling for refusing a
blood or breath alcohol content ("BAC") evidentiary test.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas
The state filed, on December 18, 2007, a suspension advisory indicating
that Matilda Kling had refused a BAC evidentiary test on December 8, 2007. (R.,
pp. 9-10.) Kling filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the notice form was
vague and that she was entitled to dismissal because the advisory was not filed
with the court within seven days of the refusal. (R., pp. 11-14.)
At the hearing on the motion the parties stipulated that Kling was stopped
and arrested for DUI, read the advisory form, and refused the BAC test. (Tr., p.
5, Ls. 13-23.) The parties also stipulated te the admission ef Exhibits A (the
ticket issued Kling); B (a copy of the advisory provided to Kling); and C (a copy of
Kling's driver's license). (Tr., p. 5, Ls. 2-25.) The court also took judicial notice
of the probable cause affidavit.' (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1-4.) Kling reiterated her claims
that her license should not be suspended because the notice of suspension was
not filed within seven days (Tr., p. 6, L. 8 - p. 7, L. 6) and the notice form was
ambiguous "as it relates to out-of-state licensed drivers" (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 7-11). The

' The probable cause affidavit is not currently included in the appellate record.
The lower courts have not addressed the issue of probable cause for the stop or
the requesting of the test. If Kling does challenge probable cause on this appeal,
the state reserves the right to augment the record with this affidavit.

magistrate concluded that filing the advisory in court more than seven days after
the refusal violated Kling's right to due process. (Tr., p. 13, L. 19 - p. 14, L. 10.)
The magistrate also dismissed the suspension case based on his conclusion that
the advisory form was vague and inconsistent with the statute. (Tr., p. 14, Ls.
11-25; R., pp. 31-34.)
The state filed a timely appeal to the district court. (R., pp. 35-37.) The
district court affirmed on the same grounds articulated by the magistrate. (R., pp.
126-38.) The state filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. (R., pp. 139-46.)

Did the magistrate err by dismissing the license suspension proceedings?

ARGUMENT
The Maaistrate Erred BVDismissina The License Suspension Proceedinas
A.

Introduction
The magistrate dismissed the license suspension proceedings on two

bases. First, he concluded that the filing of the advisory with the court ten days
after the refusal violated Kling's due process rights. (Tr., p. 13, L. 19 - p. 14, L.

10.) Second, he concluded that the advisory was vague as it related to seizing
the license of out-of-state drivers. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 7-1 1.) Neither of these bases
has legal merit.
B.

Standard Of Review
The ldaho Appellate courts will directly review the intermediate appellate

decision of the district court by determining whether competent evidence
supports the factual findings of the magistrate and whether the magistrate's
l :.
conclusions of law ?o

from those facts. State v. DeWitt, I45 Idaho 709, 711,

184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008). Statutory construction is a question of law
over which the appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Casey, 125 ldaho
856,876 P.2d 138 (1994).
C.

The Refusal License Suspension Process Does Not Require Anv Filina By
The State Within Seven Davs And No Due Process Riqht Of The Driver Is
lnfrinaed Bv A Later Filing
Under Idaho's implied consent law a motorist reasonably suspected of

DUI must perform a BAC test of the officer's choosing. I.C. § 18-8002(1). If the
motorist refuses "his driver's license or permit shall be seized by the peace

officer and forwarded to the court and a temporary permit shall be issued by the
peace officer ...." I.C. § 18-8002(4)(a). A written request for a hearing may be
filed by the motorist within seven days, and a hearing held within 30 days. I.C. Tj
18-8002(4)(b). "The hearing shall be limited to the question of why the defendant
did not submit to, or complete, evidentiary testing ...." I.C. § 18-8002(4)(b). The
court "shall sustain" the civil penalty and license suspension "unless it finds that
the peace officer did not have legal cause to stop and request him to take the
test or that the request violated his civil rights." I.C. 3 18-8002(4)(b).
It is a well established principle of statutory interpretation that "the clearly
expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect, thus leaving no occasion
for construction where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous."
State v. McCoy, 128 ldaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581 (1996) (citations
omitted). Here the statute is unambiguous. No time limit is imposed for the
officer's forwarding of information to the court. The only issues before the court
were whether the officer had legal cause to stop Kling; whether the officer in fact
asked her to submit to a test; whether the officer had reasonable grounds to
request the BAC test; whether the request for testing violated Kling's civil rights;
whether the officer properly advised Kling of the information required by statute;
whether Kling actually refused to take the test; and, if she refused, whether she
had sufficient cause to do so. State v. Griffiths, 113 ldaho 364, 368, 744 P.2d
92, 96 (1987). Nothing in the statute gives the court the authority to let Kling
avoid the consequences of her refusal based on the timing of the filing of
paperwork with the court by the police.

Compare Kane v. State, Dept. of

Transp., 139 ldaho 586, 83 P.3d 130 (Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting analysis nearly
identical to magistrate's in context of administrative license suspension).
Even if the timing of the filing were an issue that could be reached by the
court, there is no legal or factual justification for the conclusion that there was
anything even close to a violation of due process. A finding of a due process
violation from delay in the judicial process will result only if the defendant can
establish prejudice from the delay. State v. Davis, 141 ldaho 828, 842, 118 P.3d
160, 174 (Ct. App. 2005) (addressing pre-accusation delay); State v. Galli~eau,
128 ldaho 1, 909 P.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1994) (addressing appellate delay).
In this case the official action was filing paperwork on Tuesday, December
18,2007, instead of Monday, December 17,2007, when the refusal happened on
Saturday, September 8, 2007. There was never any claim of prejudice. The
very idea that Kling was prejudiced by the timing of the filing is absurd. The
magistrate's conclusion of a due process violation is without merit because Kiing
established no prejudice. The district court erred by not reversing on appeal.
D.

Klinq Did Not Prove That Her Refusal Was Justified
As stated above, the only issues before the court were whether the stop

and BAC test request were based on reasonable cause or whether the request
violated Kling's civil rights.

I.C. § 18-8002(4)(b). Kling bore the burden of

proving that her refusal to take the test was justified. Id. A driver may prevail by
proving that she was "not completely advised of [her] rights and duties under the
statute." State v. Griffiths, 113 ldaho 364, 370, 744 P.2d 92, 97 (1987). Not all
inaccuracies in the advisory are fatal to suspension, however. In Head v. State,

137 ldaho 1, 43 P.3d 760 (2002), for example, an inaccuracy in the advisory
regarding the consequences of exceeding the legal limit if the test had been
taken did not justify Head's refusal to take the test, which refusal was instead
based on his attorney not being present.
In this case the language of the statute is that the driver must be advised
that "[her] driver's license will be seized by the peace officer and a temporary
permit will be issued ...." I.C. 5 18-8002(3)(b).~The advisory stated, "Your ldaho
driver's license or permit will be seized if you have it in your possession, and if it
is currently valid you will be issued a temporary permit. Non-resident licenses
will not be seized and will be valid in ldaho for thirty (30) days from the service of
this notice of suspension unless modified or restricted by the court, provided ttie
license is valid in the issuing state." (R., p. 9, 7 4.B.)
The notice "completely advised of [Kling's] rights and duties under the
statute." State v. Griffiths, 113 ldaho 364, 370, 744 P.2d 92, 97 (1987). "[A]
drunken driver has no legal right to resist or refuse evidentiary testing." State v.
DeWitt, 145 ldaho 709,713, 184 P.3d 215,219 (Ct. App. 2008). The purpose of
the rights notification "is to overcome an unsanctioned refusal by threat instead of
force." State v. Woolery, 116 ldaho 368, 373, 775 P.2d 1210, 1215 (1989)
(internal quotations omitted). A motorist has the "right to be correctly advised by
the officer of the true consequences of refusing to take the blood-alcohol test ...."
Beem v. State, 119 ldaho 289, 805 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 7991). The notice in

Elsewhere in the statutes it is made clear that the permit should be valid for 30
days unless extended by the court. I.C. 3 18-8002(4)(a).

question accomplished all of this. It warned Kling of what, as far as we can tell
from the record, actually happened upon her refusal. Kling certainly presented
no evidence that the officer's actions after her refusal were different from what
she had been warned they would be. The notice also apprised her of the legal
consequences of her refusal - temporary driving privileges for 30 days followed
by a one-year loss of privileges unless cause for the refusal was shown in court yet she refused the test anyway. Because Kling was advised of her rights and
duties under Idaho's implied consent law, the lower courts erred by dismissing
the proceedings without imposing the required suspension of driving privileges
and civil penalty.
There is no ambiguity in the form.

It clearly notified Kling that if she

refused testing her out-of-state license would only be valid in Idaho for 30 days
unless she applied to the court and showed cause why her license should not be
suspended. (R., p. 9.) As such it notified her of her rights and duties under the
law. The lower courts erred in concluding that Kling was entitled to dismissal of
the proceedings.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court and
the magistrate's order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings on
whether Kling can show one of the justification allowed by law.
DATED this 22nd day of April 2010.
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